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Keystone
XL,
Transboundary
Harms,
and
Guidelines
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Cooperative Environmental-Impact
Assessment
ABSTRACT

While general understandingof environmental harms has
become more geographically sophisticated, environmentalimpact assessment (EIA) law has lagged behind. Although
nations now understand complex environmental processes and
relationships that extend well beyond their borders, EIA law
remains trapped in a domestic structure that is ill-prepared to
assess harms outside its jurisdiction. By looking at the U.S.
environmental assessment of the Keystone XL pipeline, this Note
recasts the problem of transboundary environmental harms in
EIA using recent, remarkable events. Key assumptions made in
the Keystone XL assessment illustrate that the typical domestic
structure of EIA law does not allow adequate assessment of
transboundaryharms and, thus, undermines the entire purpose
of the EJA process. After identifying this problem, this Note
suggests a number of guidelines for developing binding,
cooperative environmental-assessment agreements between
states that would bridge that gap and bring transboundary
harms into domestic ELA law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Professor Robert Socolow was describing major barriers to
a sustainable energy future in the United States, he suggested that
the country recognize a planetary identity.' Ever the provocative
thinker, Professor Socolow assigned a daunting name to a relatively
simple concept: that the United States should recognize the costs that
its energy decisions impose outside its borders. 2 According to
Professor Socolow, internalizing the international cost, particularly
the environmental cost, of extracting, shipping, producing, and
maintaining the immense energy resources necessary to power the
United States is essential to realizing the true cost of the nation's
energy decisions and to moving towards a sustainable future. 3 This
Note is about how to internalize the transboundary costs of a
country's energy decisions.
Internalizing the environmental cost of policy decisions has long
been the mandate of environmental impact assessments (EIAs). 4 But

1.
Robert Socolow, Co-Director, The Carbon Mitigation Initiative, Director,
Siebel Energy Grand Challenge, Princeton Envtl. Inst., Keynote Address at the
Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium: Supply and Demand: Barriers to a New Energy
Future (Feb. 24, 2012).
2.
Professor Socolow used the example of the social cost of carbon calculated
by the Department of Energy; he criticized the characterization of the number as a
reflection of the cost of carbon to the United States, explaining that the global nature of
climate change requires that the number reflect the cost of carbon to the whole world
in order to be accurate. Id.
3.
Id.
4.
See, e.g., Stephen Jay et al., Environmental Impact Assessment: Retrospect
and Prospect, 27 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 287, 287 (2007) ("[Environmental
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nearly all EIA law is domestic law that is fundamentally limited by
its jurisdiction's borders; at best the law is unprepared to address
environmental costs on the other side of the border, and at worst it is
incapable of addressing these costs. 5 International law has also been
slow to fill the gap in EIA law between domestic jurisdictions. An
international convention on the subject received only limited
acceptance 6 and achieved limited success. 7 And when EIA law cannot
account for transboundary harms, environmental assessments do not
reflect the true environmental cost of the decisions and fail to fully
inform the decision maker. As such, the problem of transboundary
8
harms remains a well-recognized and persistent problem in EIA law.
This Note is the first to illustrate the transboundary problem
using the U.S environmental assessment of the Presidential Permit
for the Keystone XL pipeline, a decision that would permit the
construction of an oil pipeline across Alberta, through the Midwest
United States, and down to the Gulf Coast of Texas to increase the
production of Canadian oil sands crude. 9 Political controversy framed
the Keystone XL decision as a fundamental indicator of U.S. energy
policy and as an excellent example of a decision that defines Professor
Socolow's planetary identity.1 0 By critically examining the decision's

impact assessment] is a systematic process for considering possible [environmental]
impacts prior to a decision being taken on whether or not a proposal should be given
approval to proceed.").
See infra Part III (asserting that the Keystone XL pipeline exemplifies a
5.
failure of domestic EIA to capture transboundary concerns).
6.
Convention on Environmental Impact Analysis in a Transboundary
Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention] (listing the
forty-five parties to the convention).
See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing generally Canada's failure to account for
7.
transboundary harms of the Keystone XL pipeline, despite being a party to the Espoo
Convention).
See infra Part II.C (detailing international recognition of the
8.
transboundary problem).
Project, TRANSCANADA,
XL
Pipeline
Keystone
9.
See
generally
http://www.transcanada.com/keystone.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
10.
Compare Upton Statement on President's Actions To Block Congressional
Approval of Keystone XL Pipeline, REPUBLICAN MAIN STREET PARTNERSHIP,
2
%80%
http://www.republicanmainstreet.org/2012/03/upton-statement-on-presidentE
99s-actions-to-block-congressional-approval-of-keystone-xl-pipeline (last visited Oct. 24,
2012), with Christa Marshall, Hansen Says Obama Will Be 'Greenwashing'AboutClimate
Change if He Approves Keystone XL Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/201 1/08/26/26climatewire-hansen-says-obama-will-begreenwashing.about-72041.html ("[NASA climatologist and environmentalist leader]
Hansen has [said] that [access to the] oil sands could mean 'game over' for the planet
when combined with greenhouse gases from coal."). Responding to President Barack
Obama's efforts to block the Keystone XL pipeline, Energy and Commerce Committee
Chairman Fred Upton stated:
A majority of the U.S. Senate voted today in favor of the job-creating
Keystone XL pipeline, but this energy project was once again stymied by
President Obama's personal rejection .... As America's largest trading partner,
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environmental assessment, this Note explains how the domestic
structure of the U.S. EIA law artificially discounted the
transboundary costs of the Keystone XL pipeline.1 1 In particular, this
Note focuses on a set of assumptions made in the U.S. assessment
that illustrate broadly how the domestic structure of EIA law can
lead to inaccurate and incomplete
information regarding
environmental costs. Having identified the failure of EIA law, this
Note argues that a structural change to EIA law is the most effective
12
way to solve the transboundary problem.
To accomplish this structural change, this Note proposes that
states enter into cooperative EIA agreements. 13 Drawing from
existing international agreements, the final section of this Note lays
out essential elements of an effective cooperative EIA agreement,
touching on the scope, structure, and goals of the agreement itself,
the content of the environmental assessment that should result from
14
the agreement, and the benefits of adopting such agreements.
This Note cannot singlehandedly solve the problem of
transboundary harms in EIA law, but it makes an effort to increase
dialogue on the issue and move towards a solution. Countries must
begin to understand the true environmental impact of their decisions
beyond their own borders in order to move towards a sustainable
energy future. 15 While the transboundary problem in EIA law is well
recognized, refraining the issue in terms of a recent energy-policy
decision with clear transboundary effects should breathe new life into
the issue and focus the problem at hand. President Barack Obama
eventually denied the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL
pipeline because of political concerns, not necessarily substantive
concerns about the environmental cost of the project. 16 As such, the

Canada's vast energy supplies present an opportunity to forge a stronger bond
with a close ally and reduce our dependence on oil imports from hostile regions
of the world. We know President Obama will continue to say no to these jobs
and energy supplies, but Congress will continue fighting to say yes ....
Keystone XL Pipeline Project, supra.
11.
See infra Part III.B (claiming that the Department of State discounted
transboundary harms by making certain unfounded assumptions).
12.
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that an effective cooperative agreement should
contain three structural elements).
13.
See generally infra Part IV.
14.
See infra Part IV (arguing for certain structural elements in international
cooperative EIA agreements and explaining the benefits of adopting an international
cooperative EIA scheme).
15.
See Socolow, supranote 1.
16.

[T]he Secretary of State has recommended that the application be
denied. And after reviewing the State Department's report, I agree.
This announcement is not a judgment on the merits of the
pipeline, but the arbitrary nature of a deadline that prevented the
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President's denial is certainly not the end of the Keystone XL pipeline
17
or the many similar international energy projects that will follow it.
Now more than ever, the problem of transboundary harms in
environmental assessment law is ripe for discussion and in dire need
of a step forward.

II.

THE DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL-IMPACT ASSESSMENT

(EIA)

EIA is generally defined as the "process of identifying,
predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, social, and
other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major
decisions being taken and commitments made. ' 18 This Part seeks to
provide background on the principles and dynamics of EIA, and
define the problem of transboundary harms within current EIA
regimes. To do so, Part II.A discusses the widespread codification of
the EIA process into domestic law through an examination of U.S.
EIA law and its broad influence. Part II.B explains how the purpose
of domestic EIA has been limited to providing complete and accurate
information to the decision maker rather than serving as a
substantive check on government actions that implicate the
environment. To frame the policy issue at hand, Part II.C discusses

State Department from gathering the information
approve the project and protect the American people.

necessary

to

Statement of the President on the Keystone XL Pipeline (Jan. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/18/statement-president-keystonexl-pipeline.
17.
For example, TransCanada has indicated its plans to continue working on
the Keystone XL pipeline:
TransCanada Corp said on Monday it will build the southern leg of its $7
billion Keystone XL oil pipeline first, skirting a full-blown U.S. review ....
The company also wrote to the U.S. State Department on Monday
detailing plans to refile an application shortly for the remainder of line
running... from the Canada-U.S. border, reminding officials that much of the
environmental assessment work is already done.
Jeffrey Jones & Roberta Rampton, TransCanadaChops Up Keystone To Push It Ahead,
REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/27/us-keystoneidUSTRE81QlII20120227; see also U.S. Leg of Keystone XL Gets Final Nod, UNITED
PRESS INT'L, July 27, 2012, available at http://www.upi.comlBusiness_News/ EnergyResources/2012/07/27[US-leg-of-Keystone- XL-gets-final-nodIUPI-77551343396176/
("TransCanada received the last of three permits needed from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to advance its 485-mile Gulf Coast Project. The company said Friday it's in a
position to start construction [on] the project in the coming weeks.").
18.
INT'L ASS'N FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT BEST PRACTICE pt. 2.1 (1999).
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international recognition of domestic EJA's failure to account for
transboundary harms.
A. From U.S. Law to InternationalLaw
EJA is most often integrated into domestic legislation, as is
exemplified by the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).19 Due to NEPA's remarkable influence on global EIA
21
policy, 20 as well as its importance in the Keystone XL assessment,
the U.S. law is a good starting point for discussion of EIA generally.
NEPA codified Congress's recognition of "the profound impact of
man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment" and the "critical importance of restoring and
maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and
development of man. '22 As such, NEPA expressed "the continuing
policy of the Federal Government ...to use all practicable means and
measures... to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations
of Americans. '23 Congress sought to fulfill these goals with EIAs,
integrating "natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and decision-making which may have an impact on
man's environment," thus ensuring "that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical
24
considerations."
To formally integrate environmental concerns into decision
making, NEPA requires an environmental impact statement (EIS) for
any "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. '25 An EIS must discuss the environmental
impact of the proposed action, potential alternatives to the proposed
action, "the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity," and "any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources." 26 To help implement these mandates, NEPA set up the

19.
See generally 42 U.S.C §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
20.
See, e.g., Jay et al., supra note 3, at 288 ("It is now over 35 years since EIA
was first enshrined in legislation in the United States.").
21.
See infra Part III.B (explaining how the domestic focus of NEPA allowed
the Department of State to make crucial assumptions regarding the Keystone XL
assessment).
22.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
23.
Id.
24.
Id. § 4332(A)-(B).
25.
Id. § 4332().
26.
Id. § 4332(C)(iv)-(v).
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executive Council on Environmental Quality. 27 Both the Council on
Environmental Quality and other executive agencies that regularly
interact with NEPA promulgate regulations on how to best
implement NEPA into their specific decision processes. 28 For
example, such regulations require that a draft of an EIS be available
for public and interagency comment, thus facilitating the
29
participation of all stakeholders in the decision-making process.
Since NEPA was codified in 1969, over 150 countries have
legislated similar domestic EIA requirements. 30 NEPA has served as
a model, and most approaches abroad reflect the same core elements
that are found in the U.S. law. 31 For example, most EIA statutes
require detailed environmental-impact analysis, strict consideration
of alternatives, proposed mitigation measures, public participation
throughout the EIA process, and public availability of the final
decision. 32 In recent years, EIA practice has become so widespread
and commonly understood that a "strong argument could be made
that the duty to assess environmental impacts has become a part of
33
customary [international] law."
B. From Substance to Procedure
Although the mandate to engage in EIA is often clear, domestic
law generally limits the assessments themselves to a procedural and
informational purpose rather than allow the assessments to have a
substantive influence on the decision maker. 34 In effect, typical EIA
law only requires that the decision maker have adequate information
on the environmental costs of the decision. The decision maker can
decide to disregard those costs, but must do so with full knowledge

27.
Id. §§ 4342, 4344.
28.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R §§ 1500-1517 (2011) (Council on Environmental
Quality's regulations regarding NEPA); 22 C.F.R. § 161 (2011) (Department of State's
regulations regarding NEPA obligations).
29.
40 C.F.R. § 1503.1.
30.
DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 500 (4th ed. 2011).

31.
See, e.g., Jay et al., supra note 4, at 288 ("Although it has been adapted to
different contexts and circumstances, its basic intentions and core elements are widely
agreed."); see also ALAN GILPIN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: CUTTING EDGE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 2 (1995) ("Since the passage of [NEPAl ... the

concept of environmental impact has spread throughout many countries ....Many
other countries have followed the US lead from the outset, creating separate EIA
legislation in the first instance.").
32.
See, e.g., GILPIN, supra note 31, at 4 (compiling characteristics of the EIA
process in Checklist 1.3).
33.
HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 30, at 500.
34.
See, e.g., Jay et al., supra note 4, at 290 ("[The] specific regulatory aim of
[EIA is] ensuring that environmental considerations are taken into account in decision
making. This is frequently stated to be the purpose of EIA, in legislation, guidance and
academic literature." (internal citations omitted)).
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and be open to public scrutiny. This subpart explains that, because of
EIA law's limited purpose, it is crucial that the EIA process results in
accurate and complete information regarding environmental costs.
This focus is, again, best exemplified by the U.S. experience with
NEPA.
Almost immediately after NEPA became law, agencies began
questioning whether the environmental assessment process had any
substantive sway on their decisions, or whether it was a purely
procedural burden that could be filed and forgotten. In 1971, this
question came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
where Judge Skelly Wright strongly asserted that NEPA gave courts
a tool to critique agency decisions with regard to environmental
impacts.3 5 Leaning on the broad commitments to environmental
quality laid out in NEPA, the court held that NEPA's EIA
requirement, though procedural, "was meant to do more than
regulate the flow of papers in the federal bureaucracy. '36 Judge
Wright noted that, given NEPA's bold language, "[i]t is hard to
37
imagine a clearer or stronger mandate to the Courts."
But Judge Wright's opinion did not guide the U.S. Supreme
Court, which read through the strong language and repudiated any
substantive use of NEPA to critique agency decisions.38 In 1978, the
Court held that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for
'39
the Nation, but its mandate to agencies is essentially procedural.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist clarified that NEPA only
requires "a fully informed and well-considered decision, not
necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or this Court
would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking
unit of the agency. '40 Later courts have maintained this deference,
41
fully embracing a procedural role for NEPA and U.S. EIA law.

35.

The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, had continually
asserted, prior to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern
itself with the adverse environmental effects of its actions. Now,
however, its hands are no longer tied. It is not only permitted, but
compelled, to take environmental values into account.

Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36.
Id. at 1117.
37.
Id. at 1115 (quotation marks omitted).
38.
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
See, e.g., Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227 (1980) ("[Tlhe only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences; it cannot 'interject itself within the area of discretion of
the executive [agency] .... "' (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21
(1976))). Intriguingly, later study revealed that Justice Rehnquist also authored the
Stryker's Bay opinion, and that the Court approved the opinion with virtually no
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As NEPA goes, so goes the world. As the first of its kind, NEPA
served as a bellwether for the proper purpose, or perhaps limit, of
EIA law in the modern regulatory structure. 42 Thus, "the introduction
of EIA outside the United States has not been heralded with the same
ambitious pronouncements as NEPA, and reflects a narrower
43
interpretation of environmental protection than implied in NEPA.
Stripped of any substantive influence over policy decisions, EIA's
remaining value is in complete and accurate information reflecting
the environmental costs of a decision. It is only with complete and
accurate information that the public can be reassured that the
decision maker fully considered environmental costs and fulfilled the
purpose of the EIA legislation. 44 In other words, completeness and
accuracy are the only means of judging the effectiveness of EIA
regimes given their limited purposes. Thus, where an EIA process
results in inaccurate or incomplete information, the purpose of the
tool is undermined and the policy is truly just another piece of
paperwork.
C. InternationalRecognition of the TransboundaryProblem
of transboundary
analysis
Inaccurate
and incomplete
environmental harms is a notorious problem in EIA policy. 4 5 The
a
in
Assessment
Impact
Environmental
on
Convention
Transboundary Context, also known as the Espoo Convention, defines
a transboundary impact as "any impact, not exclusively of a global
nature, within an area under the jurisdiction of a [state] caused by a
proposed activity the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in
part within the area under the jurisdiction of another [state]. '"46 The
problem is straightforward: EIA is primarily required by domestic
statutes to inform domestic political actors, yet many environmental
problems neither limit their harms to a single jurisdiction nor find
their cause within a single state. The problem is also reflexive: an

debate. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights
from the MarshallPapers,23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,611 (1993).
42.
See supra Part II.A (discussing NEPA's influence on global EIA policy).
43.
Jay et al., supra note 4, at 289-90.
44.
Id. at 290.
45.
Many international bodies have recognized and drawn attention to the
problem of transboundary harms in EIA. See, e.g., Espoo Convention, supra note 6, art.
2.2 (creating an obligation for the signing parties to engage in EIA where there is a risk
of transboundary harm); Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July
2-Aug. 10 2001, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 53d Sess. Supp. No. 10 (2001)
(requiring that any decision within the scope of the agreement be subject to EIA that
considers transboundary harms); UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, PRINCIPLES ON

SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES, principle 4 (1978) (endorsing a state's responsibility to
complete an EIA for any action that "may create a risk of significantly affecting the
environment of another state").
Espoo Convention, supranote 6, art. l(viii).
46.
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EIA that limits its scope to a domestic jurisdiction may not take into
account transboundary environmental harms that a domestic decision
could cause; similarly, a limited domestic EIA would not assess
transboundary causes of a domestic harm that could be mitigated or
otherwise affected by the proposed decision. Increasing recognition
among policy makers that most natural systems are interconnected,
and that most environmental harms require cooperative international
47
solutions, highlights the transboundary problem.
An EIA that fails to assess transboundary impacts is neither
complete nor accurate, and fails to fulfill its purpose of fully
informing the decision maker on environmental concerns. The Espoo
Convention illustrates that the international community is fully
aware of this problem; 48 even the International Court of Justice has
recognized a state's obligations to undergo EIA where transboundary
harms could occur. 49 However, the international community has not
yet found a meaningful way to import international EIA guidelines
for transboundary issues into domestic processes, leaving individual
states full control over the content of their EIA processes and
perpetuating a domestic focus in ETA law.
The Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
exemplifies this tension. Here, Argentina challenged Uruguay's
environmental assessment of an industrial pulp mill that discharged
waste into a border river shared by both nations.5 0 Argentina alleged
(1) that Uruguay did not conduct an environmental assessment prior
to permitting the mill, and (2) that the assessment Uruguay

47.
See, e.g., HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 30, at 459 (defining the
Common Concern of Humankind international environmental law principle as the
consensus that "because the planet is ecologically interdependent, humanity may have
a collective interest in certain activities that take place ... wholly within State
boundaries"); Mostaf K. Tolba, The Implications of the "Common Concern of Mankind"
Concept on Global Environmental Issues, 13 REvISTA IIDH 237, 238-46, (discussing the
Common Concern of Mankind, and detailing numerous instances where international
parties have recognized the interdependence of ecological problems and called for
cooperative international solutions).
See Espoo Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. ("Conscious of the need to give
48.
explicit consideration to environmental factors at an early stage in the decision-making
process by applying environmental impact assessment... particularly in a
transboundary context.").
49.

[fIn recent years [EIA] has gained so much acceptance among States
that it may now be considered a requirement under general
international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment
where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular,
on a shared resource.

Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg.v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14, 204 (April 20).
50.
See id.
203 ("[Argentina and Uruguay] disagree... with regard to the
scope and content of the environmental impact assessment that Uruguay should have
carried out.").
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eventually did create was inadequate because it failed to assess
alternative sites, improperly assessed the environmental impact of
51
the mills, and failed to adequately consult affected parties.
The International Court of Justice held that Uruguay was under
an obligation to conduct an EIA of the pulp mill on the River
Uruguay, both because of an international custom of conducting EIAs
where transboundary environmental harm may occur and also as a
result of bilateral agreements between the two parties regarding the
river. 52 However, the court held that international law does not
define the content or scope of a state's EIA. 53 Here, neither country
was a party to the Espoo Convention and its guidelines for
transboundary
EIA.5 4
Furthermore,
applicable
principles
promulgated by the UN Environment Programme were not binding
on states. 55 So while the court comfortably mandated a state
obligation to conduct an EIA where transboundary harms exist, just
how to implement transboundary harms into the EIA process
remained within the discretion of a state. 56 As such, the court
deferred to Uruguay's preferred procedure, and refused to declare the
challenged EIA as inadequate despite the assessment's nearly
57
nonexistent analysis of transboundary harms.
With regards to Argentina's other claim, the court held that an
EIA must be conducted before a project is permitted to move forward,
and that Uruguay was at fault because it permitted construction of
the mill before an assessment was complete. 58 However, the court
noted that Uruguay's obligation to create an EIA for the mill was only

51.
Id.
203, 207, 215, 231.
52.
See id. 204 (confirming that there is an obligation to conduct an EIA
imposed by a 1975 bilateral treaty between Argentina and Uruguay and also by "a
practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it
may now be considered a requirement under general international law").
53.
Id. 205.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.

Consequently, it is the view of the Court that it is for each State to
determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for
the project, the specific content of the environmental impact
assessment required in each case, having regard to the nature and
magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact
on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in
conducting such an assessment.

Id.
57.
See id. 265 ("[T]here is no conclusive evidence in the record to show that
Uruguay has not acted with the requisite degree of due diligence.").
58.
See id.
205 ("The Court also considers that an environmental impact
assessment must be conducted prior to the implementation of a project."); id. 275
("The Court has however observed that construction of that mill began before
negotiations had come to an end, in breach of the procedural obligations laid down in
the 1975 Statute.").
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a procedural requirement under the law, and that violation of a mere
procedural rather than substantive right did not merit Argentina's
desired relief of reversing Uruguay's decision to build the mill. 59 As
60
goes NEPA, so goes the rest of the world.
In sum, the obligation to assess the environmental impact of
government decisions is well accepted both domestically and
internationally. 6 1 Through time, EIA law has been limited to a
procedural role in government administration, with EIA law's
purpose exclusively defined as providing the decision maker with
complete and accurate information regarding the environmental cost
of the decision at hand. 62 As such, where a nation's EIA process
results in an inaccurate or incomplete reflection of the environmental
harm caused by the pertinent decision, that process is ineffective and
undermined. 63
Transboundary
mandate
is
its
legislative
environmental harms are a well-recognized problem facing effective
EIA. 64 International authorities recognize that environmental harms.
often span multiple jurisdictions and should be brought to the
attention of multiple domestic decision makers.6 5 As a result, the
need to undergo EIA where transboundary harms could occur is well
accepted in international law. 66 The problem is that the content of the
EIA process is left to the individual states, whose diverse and
domestically focused EIA law will not necessary capture
transboundary concerns. Thus, where a state does not explicitly
determine a way to account for transboundary harms in EIAs, the
EIA process is incomplete and is at risk of a well-recognized and
fundamental failure.

III. THE KEYSTONE XL PROBLEM
The following Part uses the U.S. Department of State's
environmental impact analysis of the Keystone XL pipeline to
demonstrate a failure of domestic EIA to capture transboundary
concerns. The Keystone XL example illustrates that the

Id.
275-76.
59.
60.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the United States' judicial characterization
of NEPA, and thus EIA generally, as a purely procedural burden with no substantive
implications).
61.
See supra Part 1I.A (discussing the codification of EIS requirements in the
United States and the international adoption of similar EIA requirements that
followed).
See supra Part II.B (discussing the limited role EIA law has had in
62.
government administration).
63.
Supra Part II.B.
64.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65.
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
66.
See supranotes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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transboundary
problem plagues even the exemplary and
67
sophisticated EIA law of the United States.
Part III.A will explain unique aspects of the procedure that led
up to the Department of State's assessment of the Keystone pipeline.
In particular, the subpart focuses on communications between the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of State
to highlight three transboundary problems identified early in the EIA
process. Part III.B traces those same three transboundary concerns
through the Department of State's final environmental assessment,
and explains how the domestic focus of NEPA allowed the
Department of State to make crucial assumptions about Canadian
policy decisions that significantly discounted the gravity of these
transboundary harms. Those three assumptions are the Oil Demand
Assumption, the Extraction Efficiency Assumption, and the Land Use
Governance Assumption. Finally, Part III.C distinguishes between
structural problems in ETAs and the issue of agency capture,
explaining that the domestic focus of most EIA law, rather than
agency actors acting in bad faith, is the primary obstacle to
considering transboundary harms.
A. Explanation of the Keystone XL Process
Numerous regulations augment the basic NEPA assessment for
international pipeline projects involving the United States, and some
explanation of the process is useful to understand the context of the
Department of State's final environmental impact assessment.
1.

Understanding the Procedure

All oil pipelines that cross the border of the United States
require a Presidential Permit to begin construction. 68 In 2004, the
President delegated the responsibility for receiving Presidential
Permit applications for international oil pipelines to the Department
of State. 69 As such, the company seeking to build the Keystone XL
pipeline applied for a Presidential Permit through the Department of
State on September 19, 2008.70

67.
See supra Part L.A (discussing the long history and influence of NEPA law
on other nations' EJA regimes).
68.
See Exec. Order No. 11,423, 3 C.F.R § 742 (1970) ("Whereas the proper
conduct of the foreign relations of the United States requires that executive permission
be obtained for the construction and maintenance at the borders of the United States of
facilities connecting the United States with a foreign country.").
69.
See Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299, 25,299 (2004) (designating
and empowering the Secretary of State to receive all applications for Presidential
Permits).
70.
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE
PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL PROJECT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-1 & fig.ES-1 (Aug. 26,
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As a U.S. federal agency, the Department of State is subject to
NEPA regulations. 71 The agency determined that the Presidential
Permit process was a major federal action that may significantly
affect the environment and, thus, began the EIS process as required
by NEPA. 72 Modern EIA under NEPA is a cooperative process
involving consultation of multiple agencies. 7 3 The Department of
State was the lead agency in the Keystone XL assessment and
74
retained primary responsibility for fulfilling NEPA obligations.
75
Additionally, the EPA is charged with critically reviewing all EIAs.
In conjunction with this duty, the EPA has developed a rating system
by which the agency assesses the adequacy of an EIS and makes
76
suggestions for improvement.
2.

The EPA's Transboundary Concerns

On April 16, 2010, the Department of State released a Draft EIS
for public comment and agency review. 77 The EPA reviewed the Draft
EIS as required and gave the assessment its lowest rating: "Category
3-Inadequate Information. '7 8 The EPA listed numerous critiques, but
this subpart focuses specifically on a set of transboundary issues that

2011) [hereinafter KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at
http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/l82010.pdf.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2012) (applying and implementing § 4332 of NEPA
71.
to federal agencies).
72.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES- 1.
73.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE PROPOSED KEYSTONE XL PROJECT title p. (Aug. 26, 2011) [hereinafter
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS], available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/
archive/dos-docs/feis/index.htm (listing the sixteen government actors who cooperated
to complete the environmental assessment).
74.
Id. § 1.0.
75.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2006) ("The Administrator [of the EPA] shall
review and comment in writing on the environmental impact of any matter.., to
");40 C.F.R. § 1503.2 (explaining an agency's duty to
which [NEPA] applies ....
comment if the agency has "special expertise" in an environmental impact addressed by
an EIS); see also Letter from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm'r for Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Jose Fernandez, Assistant Sec'y for
Econ., Energy and Bus. Affairs, Dept. of State, and Kerri Ann-Jones, Assistant Sec'y
for Oceans, Int'l Envtl. & Scientific Affairs, Dept. of State 1 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter
http://www.sierraclub.org/
Draft
EIS], available at
EPA
Comments
on
environmentallaw/tarsands/pipeline-keystone-xlstate-dept-permit-process/EPA%20
Comments%20on%20DEIS%2010-7-16.pdf ("The [EPA] has reviewed the Draft
[EIS] ...pursuant to our authorities under [NEPA], Council on Environmental Quality
NEPA regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and Section 309 of the Clean Air Act.").
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Rating System Criteria, ENVTL.
76.
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/comments/ratings.html
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
(last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
77.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-2
fig.ES-1.
78.
EPA Comments on Draft EIS, supra note 75, at 7.
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were not sufficiently addressed by the Department of State in the
79
early EISs.
First, the EPA asked the Department of State to better assess
alternative scenarios to the proposed pipeline, particularly scenarios
on how Canadian policy decisions could affect "national energy and
climate policy objectives" of the United States.8 0 Further, the EPA
suggested that the Department of State address "different oil demand
scenarios over the fifty year project life" to analyze how access to
Canadian crude oil would affect demand for other imported crude
oils. 8 ' Finally, the EPA encouraged the Department of State to
discuss the "differences in environmental impacts of non-Canadian
crude oil sources and [Canadian] oil sands crude" and emphasize "the
national security implications of expanding the Nation's long-term
'
commitment to a relatively high carbon source of oil."82
The EPA explained that utilizing Canadian oil sands crude could
potentially result in 82 percent more greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions than using comparable foreign crude oils; an increase
similar to adding seven coal-fired power plants to yearly U.S. GHG
emissions.8 3 It is important to note that the EPA's analysis here was
"well-to-tank," and implicitly included extraction processes,
transportation, construction, and other activities that occur on the
Canadian side of the border.8 4 The EPA's concern with increased
GHG emissions was also tied to its interest in alternative oil demand
scenarios; the EPA remarked that there is a "close causal connection"
between building Keystone XL and opening new markets to increase
extraction and global consumption of the more emissions-heavy
85
Canadian crude oil.
The EPA also shined a light on more tangible transboundary
environmental harms, noting, for example, that extraction activities
across the Canadian border would likely affect migratory bird
populations from the United States.8 6 The EPA explained that "30%
of North America's landbirds breed in the boreal forests of Canada
and Alaska," and that the significant deforestation associated with

79.
See id. at 1-6 (outlining the various topics within the Draft EIS on which
the EPA believes additional information and analysis is necessary).
80.
See id. at 1-2 (discussing the need to investigate alternatives and broadly
analyze their effect on the United States' "national energy and climate policy
objectives").
81.
Id. at 2.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 2-3.
84.
Id. at 2.
85.
Id. at 3.
86.
Id. at 6.
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extracting Canadian crude would likely harm the populations that
87
reside in the United States.
Aware of these significant inadequacies in the Draft EIS, the
Department of State released a Supplemental Draft EIS on April 15,
2011, to help address the EPA and other commenters' concerns. 8 8 The
EPA rated this EIS only one step higher, as category 2 "Insufficient
Information," which signified that the EPA "identified significant
environmental impacts" that were not addressed to the EPA's
satisfaction.8 9 The EPA remained critical of the Department of State's
analysis, recommending "that the State Department improve... the
discussion of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions ...associated with
oil sands crude, and improve the analysis of potential impacts
to... migratory bird populations." 90
With regard to GHG emissions, the EPA specifically criticized
the Department of State for underestimating the potential
comparative increase in emissions caused by extracting and using
Canadian crude (rather than other crudes) by about 20 percent.91
Further, the EPA advised against the Department of State's
conclusion that the demand scenario that would likely be created by
Keystone XL would not change global GHG emissions. 9 2 The EPA
also recommended that any further discussion regarding the
comparative GHG emissions of Canadian crude or the change in
global GHG emissions caused by Keystone XL "include a detailed
description of efforts ongoing and under consideration by [Canadian]
producers, as well as the government of Alberta, to reduce GHG
emissions from oil sands production."93 Additionally, the EPA
acknowledged that the Supplemental Draft EIS included "a summary
of regulatory and other programs aimed at protecting migratory bird
populations that may be affected by oil sands extraction activities in

87.
See id. (pointing out that effects on migratory bird forest populations "can
be felt throughout the birds' migratory range, including.., in the United States").
88.
fig.ES-1.

KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-3

89.
Letter from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm'r for Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Jose Fernandez, Assistant Sec'y for
Econ., Energy and Bus. Affairs, Dept. of State, and Kerri Ann-Jones, Assistant Sec'y
for Oceans, Int'l Envtl. & Scientific Affairs, Dept. of State 8-9 (June 6, 2011)
[hereinafter
EPA Comments
on Supplemental Draft EIS], available at
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/06/07/documentg.gw_02.pdf.
90.
Id. at 2.
91.
Id. at 6.
92.
See id. (noting that the Department of State based its GHG-emission
analysis on the impact the project would have on the global emissions level, and
suggesting that the Department of State should not have compared the GHG emissions
associated with the single project to the global GHG-emission levels).
93.
Id. at 7.
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Canada," but suggested that the Department of State discuss how to
94
mitigate the harms that would occur across the border.
The Department of State released its Final EIS of Keystone XL
on August 26, 2011.95 As illustrated below, the Final EIS still does
not sufficiently address the transboundary concerns first highlighted
by the EPA in response to the Draft EISs. In these early
communications with the Department of State, the EPA laid the
groundwork for the three assumptions discussed extensively in the
next subpart. The EPA questioned how the Department of State
framed potential oil demand scenarios created by Keystone XL,
highlighting the Oil-Demand Assumption described in detail below.
Similarly, the EPA repeatedly pointed out the potential for
significantly higher GHG emissions associated with using Canadian
crude rather than other comparable foreign crudes, touching on the
Extraction-Efficiency Assumption discussed below. Finally, the EPA
identified transboundary land-use harms that could affect the United
States yet are beyond NEPA jurisdiction, laying the foundation for
the Land-Use Governance Assumption discussed below. These three
assumptions show that, even in light of the EPA's candor, the
domestic scope of NEPA and the jurisdictional limits of the
Department of State's EIA discounted these transboundary harms. As
such, the Department of State's Final EIS illustrates the
fundamental problem of using domestic EIA law to assess projects
with international impacts.
B. The Department of State's Three TransboundaryAssumptions
The domestic scope of the Department of State's Final EIS
allowed the agency to make three key assumptions. First, the
Department of State assumed that the Keystone XL pipeline would
have no effect on the world demand for Canadian crude oil or the U.S.
demand for other foreign heavy crude oils; this is the Oil-Demand
Assumption. 96 By assuming inelastic demand, the Department of
State could conclude that the pipeline would not affect global GHG
emissions. Second, the Department of State assumed that Canadian
crude would be extracted using increasingly more efficient and loweremission technology at a rate and mixture that would fill the
pipeline's expected capacity; this is the Extraction-Efficiency
Assumption. 97 This assumption allowed the United States to conclude
that there was no substantial difference between the overall GHG
emissions associated with Canadian crude when compared to other

94.
95.
fig.ES-1.
96.
97.

Id. at 7-8.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-3
Infra Part III.B.1.
Infra Part III.B.2.
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foreign heavy crudes. Third, the Department of State assumed that
other responsible government agencies would ensure that extraction
and pretransport processing of Canadian crude would have no
significant effect on the environment; this is the Land-Use
Governance Assumption.9 8 This assumption allowed the Department
of State to ignore any environmental harms to resources across the
Canadian border, as well as any harms that could occur across the
border but would have effects on U.S. resources.
Each of these assumptions allowed the Department of State to
avoid potentially significant transboundary environmental harms,
skewing its analysis and undermining the informational purpose of
whole assessment. However, each assumption turns on policy
decisions of another actor, namely Canada or its provinces. As Part
III.C explains, these other state actors could be included in an
expanded, cooperative environmental assessment process in which
accurate information, rather than speculation, guides the assessment.
1.

The Oil-Demand Assumption

To assess the Keystone XL pipeline's effect on demand for
various crudes, the Department of State relied on a single report
commissioned by the Department of Energy. 99 The government
retained petroleum industry consulting firm Ensys "to better
understand the potential impacts of the presence or absence of the
[Keystone XL] pipeline on U.S. refining and petroleum imports, and
also on international markets." 100 Ensys's analysis addressed a
primary environmental concern of the project: changes in GHG
emissions caused by Keystone XL's effect on supply and demand of
crude oil. 101
Fundamentally, the Ensys report concluded that the Keystone
XL pipeline decision, regardless of the outcome, would have no effect
on U.S. or global supply and demand of crude oil and no effect on
global GHG emissions.10 2 Regarding U.S. supply and demand, Ensys

98.
Infra Part III.B.3.
99.
See KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supranote 70, at ES-11
(relying solely on the report commissioned by the Department of Energy when
concluding that the pipeline will not affect the demand for crude oil); U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED
KEYSTONE XL PROJECT 3-188 (Aug. 26, 2011) [hereinafter KEYSTONE XL

SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS] available
documents/ organization/182272.pdf (same).
100.

at

http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/

ENSYs ENERGY & SYS., INC., KEYSTONE XL ASSESSMENT: FINAL REPORT 10

(Dec. 23, 2010).
101.
See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 10 (discussing that a major environmental
concern of the Keystone XL project is an increased supply of Canadian crude, which
releases more carbon dioxide emissions than traditional crude).
102.

ENSYs ENERGY & SYS., INC., supra note 100, at 116.
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noted that refining capacity in the U.S. Gulf Coast would continue to
increase, and that both Canadian crude and other traditional foreign
crude imports would feed the demand.10 3 As such, U.S. demand was
simplified dramatically and treated as a constant: adding access to
more Canadian crude would only adjust the ratio of Canadian crude
refined in the Gulf Coast to other foreign crude oils. 10 4 Key to this
conclusion was Ensys's finding that U.S. demand was so high that
alternative routes for Canadian crude to the Gulf Coast would be
exploited over time, and demand for traditional foreign crudes would
remain constant even if those sources declined in reliability and
increased in cost. 10 5 Thus, Keystone would not affect U.S. supply or
demand, but only the respective market shares of Canadian crude in
comparison to more traditional Mexican, Venezuelan, or Middle
10 6
Eastern crudes in the short term.
Similarly, the report noted that where the United States does
not take Canadian crude, there is ample demand from Asia.' 0 7 Ensys
found that demand in Asian markets would only increase in the near
future.' 0 8 The report noted that a number of comparatively lowvolume pipelines already bring Canadian crude to the Canadian coast
for export to Asia, but higher-volume projects had been proposed to
dramatically increase Canada's capacity across the Pacific.' 0 9 Thus,
the report concluded that there was an inelastic demand for
Canadian crude; it would either be piped to the United States for
refining, or ferried to Asian ports for their use. 110
The Department of State used Ensys's report to conclude that
Keystone XL would have no effect on the overall GHG emissions of
Canadian crude."' The logic was deceptively simple; if the United

Id.
103.
104.
See id. ("[C]hanging [Canadian] crude export routes would not
alter. . . U.S. and global product demand... [I]f [the Keystone XL pipeline] were not
built-there would be market demand to put in place broadly similar capacity,
including to the U.S. Gulf Coast.").
See id. at 62 ("U.S. total crude imports are essentially the same in the
105.
scenario in which Canadian exports to the U.S. are the highest and the lowest. U.S. oil
demand and domestic production were not changed between pipeline scenarios and,
therefore, total crude imports remain unchanged."); id. at 99 ("[Changes to] U.S. import
volumes of Mexican plus Venezuelan crudes are... only minimally affected by
availability of pipelines delivering imported [Canadian] crude.").
106.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 117-18.
107.
108.
Id. at 117 ("Asia, the region which will constitute 75% of the world's
refining capacity growth between now and 2030.").
Id. at 19 (discussing "The China Factor" as significant pressure to expand
109.
transport capabilities to British Columbia and across the Pacific Ocean).
110.
Id. at 116 (concluding that Keystone XL "would not alter either U.S.,
Canadian, or total global crude supply.., or U.S. and global product demand and
quality").
111.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-11;
KEYSTONE XL SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS, supra note 99, at 3-196.
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States did not import Canadian crude, someone else would. The
question was then not whether the United States would impact the
environment by exclusively refining the Canadian crude for eventual
use, but whether refining Canadian crude would be any more harmful
to the environment than refining the other foreign heavy crudes that
the United States would import anyway." 2 Either way, Ensys
concluded that Canadian crude would be imported, refined, and
consumed somewhere in the world and, thus, the U.S. decision to
participate would not increase global GHG emissions.11 3
However, the final resting place of Canadian crude is not
determined by demand alone, but also by the political choices of
Canada's regulators and their vocal electorate." 4 In particular,
Ensys's report downplayed two likely alternative scenarios that rely
5
heavily on Canadian political decisions."
First, it is reasonably possible that Canada's proposed high
volume connection to China, a pipeline called the Northern Gateway,
would be stopped by environmental and socioeconomic concerns
similar to those that nip at Keystone XL. 11 6 The company Enbridge
proposed the Northern Gateway, touting significant economic gains
and energy security, but it has run into backlash from those
populations threatened by the environmental harms associated with
the project." 7 Political capital has already been levied against the
idea of using tankers to export Canadian crude off the coast of British
Columbia-arguably more political capital than the opponents of
Keystone XL could muster in the United States." 8 Without either the

112.
See KEYSTONE XL SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS, supra note 99, at 3-196
(discussing how studies gauged "incremental GHG emissions"); see also discussion
infra Part III.B.2.
113.
ENSYs ENERGY & SYS., INC., supra note 100, at 116.
114.
See id. at 18 ("Extensive work would be required with various
organizations, including the NEB, Port Metro Vancouver and First Nation groups
before the projects could go ahead. Permits would be required for expansion. In
addition, agreements with landowners along the route may have to be renegotiated.").
115.
See id. (dismissing the difficulties facing the Northern Gateway as only
rendering "timing uncertain").
116.
See, e.g., Bill Graveland, Aboriginal Leader Says Opposition to Northern
Gateway Not
Just
Environmental, CANADIAN
BUS.
(Mar.
1,
2012),
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/article/73643--aboriginal-leader-says-opposition-tonorthern-gateway-not-just-environmental ("Northern Gateway has attracted fierce
opposition from First Nations, environmental and other groups who fear oil could be
spilled from the pipeline itself or from the tankers sailing through narrow coastal
channels and cause grave ecological harm.").
117.
Id. See generally ENBRIDGE N. GATEWAY PIPELINES, WE'RE BUILDING MORE
THAN PIPELINES, available at http-l:www.northerngateway.calassets/pdflProject%
20Brochure/ENBNGPBrochureOct26.pdf (detailing the Northern Gateway project in
the best light possible, highlighting its ability to access growing oil markets and
Enbridge's commitment to aboriginal and environmental concerns).
118.
See B.C. Oil Tanker Ban Motion Passes in Commons, CBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010,
6:46 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadalstory/2010/12/07/oil-tanker-motion.html?ref-rss
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Northern Gateway or Keystone XL, Canadian crude would be
landlocked, bottlenecked by a limited transport infrastructure that
has historically made the oil sands commercially unattractive. 119
Without access to either China or the United States, and with there
being a very real risk of no development at all, the carbon trapped in
Canadian crude would no longer be guaranteed emissions, and the
decision to build Keystone XL becomes a key to unlocking a
significant source of GHGs that would substantially contribute to
global climate change.
With the fortune of hindsight, activity in the oil industry
following the denial of the Keystone XL permit emphasizes the
possibility of this first scenario. Enbridge, the company behind
Canada's high-capacity pipeline to the Pacific, recently purchased
significant interest in a pipeline that connects the Gulf Coast
refineries to a Midwest pipeline hub in Cushing, Oklahoma. 120 The
pipeline, called the Seaway, typically pumps crude upstream from the
12 1
Gulf Coast to the Midwest for storage and further transport.
However, Enbridge and the co-owner of the Seaway have announced
that they seek regulatory approval to reverse the flow of the pipeline
from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast. 122 Should the Seaway reverse
flow, a significant surplus of U.S. oil would be rerouted to the Gulf
Coast to fulfill increasing demand in the short term. 12 3 Perhaps more
importantly, reversing the Seaway would complete a series of
Enbridge-controlled pipelines from Alberta to the Gulf Coast, opening

(referring to the relatively significant political pull that environmental causes have in
western Canada, particularly in British Columbia).
119.

There [have] been instances of capacity restrictions and "allocations"
with associated shut-ins of [Canadian crude] production. The
bottlenecks were also causing reductions in the prices obtained for
Western Canadian

crudes,

especially

the heavy

grades ....

As a

consequence, Canadian producers, shippers and government agencies
deriving revenue from production were all being adversely affected
economically .... [This history] reinforces how sensitive WCSB heavy
crude discounts are to having sufficient export pipeline capacity in
operation and the consequences in lost revenue of periods when
capacity is inadequate.
ENSYs ENERGY & SYS., INC., supra note 100, at 12.

120.
Mike Lee, Enbridge, Enterprise Join Forces To Alleviate U.S. Crude Glut,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 17, 2011, 9:44 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2 011-11-1 7/enbridge-enterprise-join-forces-to-alleviate-u-s-crude-glut.html
(reporting on Enbridge purchase of interest in Seaway, intent to reverse flow of
pipeline, and the potential to fulfill Gulf Coast refining demand with U.S. and
Canadian oil); see also, Enbridge, Enbridge Upsizes Capacity of Gulf Coast Access
Projects, 76 EBRIDGE, http://ebridge.enbridge.com/ eBridgelvolume76/articlel.php (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012) (describing shipping capacity).
121.
Lee, supranote 120.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
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another avenue for Canadian crude into the United States. 124 The
Seaway's ability to ease supply of bottlenecked Canadian crude may
undercut the need for the Northern Gateway enough that the pipeline
succumbs to political pressures. Thus, a scenario where Keystone XL
is the only serious means of utilizing Canadian crude and its
resulting GHG emissions is quite possible.
Second, Canada will probably try to move forward with the
Northern Gateway even if Keystone XL is built. The Canadian federal
government has long supported expanding the market for Canadian
crude. 125 Prime Minister Stephen Harper has declared Canada an
"energy superpower" since 2006, relying on the country's wealth of oil
in an increasingly unstable global market. 126 The current Minister of
Natural Resources has also explained the "fundamental strategic
objective of Canada to diversify [its] customer base," citing
demonstrated Chinese interest in Canadian oil. 127 Upon President
Obama's decision to delay the Keystone XL decision, the Minister
called for an expedited approval of Enbridge's Northern Gateway
pipeline, expecting a decision by early 2013.128 Although it is
uncertain whether the Northern Gateway will survive the regulatory
process, it is clear that the Canadian government will push the
Northern Gateway forward, regardless of whether Keystone XL is
eventually approved by the U.S. government. 12 9 Even though the
Ensys report acknowledges "that [Canadian] crude volumes into the
U.S. are sensitive to the development of pipelines within Canada to
the British Columbia coast and thence to markets in Asia,"'l the

124.
Id. Interestingly, Ensys's study noted the potential for reversing the
Seaway, but discounted the possibility due to a "continuing need to move crude
volumes north." Keystone XL Assessment: Final Report, supra note 100, at 28.
125.
See Canwest News Serv., Harper Calls Canada "Energy Superpower,"
http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/
(July
14,
2006),
CANADA.COM
(describing Prime
story.html?id=59c9a6fd-5d35-4ab4-ale9-b2de9d507697&k=46557
Minister Stephen Harper's support for a "free exchange of energy products based on
competitive market principles").
126.
Id.
Keystone Pipeline Delays Will Be 'Costly,' CBC NEWS, http://news.ca.msn.coml
127.
top-stories/keystone-pipeline-delays-will-be-costly-3 (last updated Nov. 13, 2011).
128.
See Gary Park, Canadian Minister Sees Northern Gateway Approval
Process Expedited 1 Year, PLATTS (Nov. 13, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://www.platts.coml
RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeedOi3783938 (quoting the Natural Resources Minister
as saying that Canada's government wants to broaden its customer base outside the
United States).
129.
See id. (recognizing that the "Northern Gateway is facing similar
environmental opposition to Keystone XL as it prepares to embark on public hearings,"
despite strong federal support).
130.

ENSYs ENERGY & SYS., INC., supra note 100, at 117.
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limited, economic scope of the Ensys report did not account for
13 1
significant backing by the Canadian federal government.
As defined by the government agency that commissioned the
study, Ensys limited its analysis to U.S. refining capabilities, demand
markets, and import dependency, all viewed through a domestic lens,
explicitly excluding Canadian economic interests and the effects on
Canadian production of oil sands crude. 132 By narrowing the scope of
the analysis to avoid Canadian political interests and potential
difficulties in expanding access to China, Ensys was able to
oversimplify and arrive at a concise conclusion: what was not utilized
by the United States would be shipped to China, and, all other things
being equal, supply into the United States would not change. 1 33 These
conclusions were the fundamental basis for Ensys's assertion that the
Keystone XL pipeline would have no effect on global GHG
emissions. 134 Acknowledging the political elements of this equation,
the potential that the neither the Northern Gateway nor Keystone XL
may go forward, or that the Northern Gateway may go forward and
undercut Keystone XL's supply to the United States, makes Ensys's
and the Department of State's simple answer very uncertain and
unlikely. This reality, in turn, casts doubt upon the Department of
State's conclusion that Keystone XL will result in no significant GHG
emissions.
2.

The Extraction-Efficiency Assumption

Upon concluding that Canadian crude would be refined and
utilized somewhere in the world, if not in the United States, the
Department of State assessed the next logical GHG question: whether
refining and utilizing Canadian crude is more GHG-intensive than
burning traditional foreign crudes. 13 5 A crude oil is more GHGintensive than another if it results in greater GHG emissions through
the entire life cycle of its production, from extraction to consumption.
The Department of State concluded that, on average, Canadian crude
is more GHG-intensive than traditional foreign crudes, such that
importing more Canadian oil could significantly increase the overall
U.S. GHG emissions. 136 However, the Department of State mitigated
this concern with two observations. First, it noted that the GHG

131.
See id. at 17-19 (acknowledging the possibility for Chinese development of
demand, but concluding that most projects to the coast either have uncertain economic
interests or are encountering resistance).
132.
Id. at 116.
133.
See id. (stating that this situation would arise because "the same slate of
crude oils would have to be refined even if reallocated geographically").
134.
Id. at 80.
135.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-15.
136.
See id. (stating that the increase could be in the range of 3 million to 21
million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions per year).
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intensity of Canadian crude varied widely, from 37 percent more
intensive than traditional crudes to 2 percent less intensive than
traditional crudes, depending upon the kind of technology used to
extract the Canadian crude and prepare it for transport. 137 Second,
the Department of State noted that traditional foreign crudes were
becoming more difficult to extract, requiring more energy and
emissions, while technology for extracting Canadian crude was
expected to become more efficient over time, narrowing the
comparative difference between the crudes. 13 8 With these mitigating
factors in mind, the Department of State seized on the uncertainty
and dismissed Canadian crude's comparative increase in GHG
emissions, concluding that "on balance, it appears that the gap in
'13 9
greenhouse gas intensity may decrease over time.
To support these two mitigating factors, and eventually dismiss
the comparative increase in GHG emissions caused by utilizing
Canadian crude, the Department of State relied on two assumptions
that implicated Canadian political decisions. First, Albertan
extractors would use the lowest-emissions technology and continue to
improve that technology over time such that Canadian crude would
begin at the low end of the comparative GHG spectrum and continue
to get more efficient. 140 Second, Canadian crude would be mixed for
transport at an expected ratio because a different mixture could
require more energy to pump through the pipeline and could take
14 1
longer to travel the distance.
The Department of State supported its conclusions with the
Ensys report and a report by ICF International. 142 The Departrhent of
State used the Ensys report for the conclusion that global GHG
emissions would not be affected by the Keystone XL pipeline and
subsequent utilization of Canadian oil sands crude in the oil
markets. 143 As noted above, acknowledging Canada's political
interests and potential difficulties in accessing an Asian oil market
144
casts significant doubts on the study's broad conclusion.

137.

KEYSTONE XL SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS, supra note 99, at 3-194.

138.

KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-15.

139.
Id.
See KEYSTONE XL SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS, supra note 99, at 3-199 ("In
140.
particular, the results depend on assumptions regarding the use of petroleum coke at
oil sands facilities, and upon the weighted-average mix of [Canadian] oil sands crude
transported to the United States by the proposed Project or some other transboundary
pipeline.").
141.
Id. at 3-192 to -194.
142.
Id. at 3-188 (introducing both the Ensys report and the ICF report).
143.
See id. at 3-196 ("[B]ased on the EnSys (2010) analysis, under most
scenarios the proposed Project would not substantially influence the rate or magnitude
of oil extraction activities in Canada, or the overall volume of crude oil transported to
the U.S. or refined in the U.S.").
144.
See discussion supraPart III.B.1 (reviewing political and business factors).
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The ICF report was commissioned "to provide context for
understanding the potential indirect, cumulative [greenhouse gas]
impact of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline" by synthesizing
preexisting studies on the GHG intensity of various crude oils and the
extraction processes available to Canadian oil sands crude. 14 5 The
ICF report made the assumptions that underlie its conclusions
clear. 14 6 First, the ICF report hedged the conclusion of the Ensys
report: ICF noted that, while global GHG emissions would not
change, U.S. GHG emissions would increase if Canadian oil displaces
other traditional crudes. 14 7 ICF then illustrated Canadian crude's
comparative range of emissions increases, between 2 percent less
GHG-intensive and 37 percent more GHG-intensive than traditional
crudes, but clearly listed the variables that supported that analysis:
"The incremental increase depends upon (i) the throughput of the
pipeline, (ii) the mix of oil sands crudes transported by the pipeline,
and (iii) the GHG-intensity of the crudes in the pipeline compared to
148
the crudes they displace."'
All three of these variables are controlled by Canadian
regulation and policy choices, which are beyond the scope of the
assessment and subject to estimation and guessing across the U.S.
border. 149 By inviting estimation, the Department of State was able
to ignore the potentially significant increase in GHG emissions
because of uncertainty; the agency simply could not predict how
Canada
would
regulate
the extraction,
preparation,
and
transportation of Canadian oil sand crude without asking Canadian
regulators.
There is also significant reason to worry that Canadian
extractors will use more inefficient and energy-intensive methods
than the Department of State optimistically predicted. There are two
primary means of extracting crude from oil sands like those at issue
in Canada: conventional strip mining and in situ processing, where
steam is injected into the soil to increase the viscosity of the desirable
crude so that it can flow out. 150 Strip mining is only available if the
oil sands are within seventy-five meters of the surface, and in situ

145.
ICF INT'L, LIFE CYCLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS OF PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS FROM WCSB OIL SANDS CRUDES COMPARED WITH REFERENCE CRUDES 1

(2011) [hereinafter ICF Report].
146.
Id. at 14-26.
147.
Id. at 48.
148.
Id.
149.
See, e.g., Oil Sands Conservation Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 0-7, § 3(g) (Can. Alta.)
('The purposes of this Act are ... to ensure the observance, in the public interest, of
safe and efficient practices in the exploration for and the recovery, storing, processing
and transporting of oil sands, discard, crude bitumen, derivatives of crude bitumen and
oil sands products.").
150.
ICF Report, supra note 145, at 15.
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processing is necessary otherwise. 15 1 In situ methods are more GHGintensive than strip-mining methods. 15 2 Generally, over 40 percent of
Canadian oil sands crude is currently produced using in situ
extraction. 15 3 Using averaged GHG emissions of in situ extraction
and assuming expected flow patterns of the pipeline, it is most likely
that Canadian crude will be 9 percent to 17 percent more GHGintensive at initial pipeline capacity and 11 percent to 21 percent
more GHG-intensive at potential pipeline capacity. 154 This narrower
and more accurate scale illustrates a more alarming effect on U.S.
GHG emissions than the Department of State's broader, less certain
scale of 2 percent to 37 percent. 155 Particularly since "in situ
extraction methods are projected to represent a larger share of the
overall oil sands production-increasing from about 45 percent of
'
2009 oil sands production to an estimated 53 percent by 2030. 156
Further, the longer that Canadian oil sands are mined for crude, the
deeper the extraction process required and, thus, the more necessary
in situ extraction becomes. 157 This will cause a projected increase of
in situ extraction from 15 percent to 40 percent by 2030 in some
158
regions.
The variables of this calculus, the potential output of Keystone
XL, the mixture of crude in the pipeline, and the extraction process
used are all Canadian and industry decisions beyond the scope of the
Department of State's domestic environmental assessment. By
keeping information across the border, the Department of State is
able to harness uncertainty that may not really be present and
discount potentially significant increases in U.S. GHG emissions
caused by the Keystone XL decision.

151.
Id.
152.
Id.
See id. at 41 n.26 (discussing bitumen production).
153.
154.
Id. at 45.
155.
See id. at 48 ("[Fjrom the standpoint of the U.S. carbon footprint, on a life
cycle basis, displacing reference crudes with oils sands crudes could result in an
increase in the footprint."); see also KEYSTONE XL SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT EIS, supra
note 99, at 3-194 (describing the effect of extraction methodology on GHG emission).
156.
Id. at 47.
See id. ("[IMt will become more energy-intensive to produce reference crudes
157.
over time as fields mature and secondary and tertiary recovery techniques, such as C02
flooding are required to maintain production levels.").
158.
Id.
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The Land-Use Governance Assumption

The Department of State also dodged realization of more
concrete and quantifiable environmental harms by assuming that
responsible Canadian agencies will ensure that processing of
Canadian oil sands crude does not significantly harm the
environment. U.S. law does not require the Department of State to
address environmental harms across the Canadian border; they are
beyond the scope of a domestic environmental assessment. 159
However, "[a]s a matter of policy, and in response to concerns that the
proposed Project would contribute to certain continental scale
environmental impacts," the Department of State provided a brief
assessment of environmental harms across the border. 6 0 Generally,
the Department of State incorporated the Canadian National Energy
Board's (the Board) environmental assessment of the Keystone XL
project, and repeatedly assured that any extraction project or oil
pipeline would be assessed and permitted by federal and provincial
161
Canadian regulators.
With regard to the Board's environmental assessment, the
Department of State summarized that "[t]he Board's assessment
included evaluations of need, economic feasibility, potential
commercial impacts, potential environmental and socioeconomic
effects, appropriateness of the general route of the pipeline, potential
impacts on Aboriginal interests, and other issues.' 1 62 As such, the
U.S. agency was comfortable deferring to the Board's judgment that
no significant environmental harm would occur in Canada as a result
of the Keystone XL decision. The Board, however, also narrowed its
analysis to avoid environmental effects of the pipeline in the United

159.

KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-22.

160.
KEYSTONE XL SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFr EIS, supra note 99, at 3-200.
161.
For example, § 3.14.4 of the Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact
Statement for the Proposed Keystone XL Project states:
This section addresses (1) the Canadian National Energy Board (NEB)
environmental analysis of the Keystone XL Project in Canada, (2) the potential
influence of the proposed Project on oil sands development in Canada, (3) a
summary of environmental impacts of oil sands development in Alberta, and (4)
protections for Canadian and U.S. shared Migratory Bird and Threatened and
Endangered Species resources.
Id. at 3-201; see also id. at 3-202 (stating, in response to worries of environmental
impacts of oil sand extraction, that "[glovernment regulators of oil sands activities in
Canada are working to manage and provide regional standards for air quality, land
impact, and water quality and consumption based on a cumulative effects approach");
id. at 3-204 (stating, in response to worries about harm to migratory birds and other
wildlife, that "[o]il sands projects and oil transportation pipelines are evaluated and
permitted by Canadian federal and provincial Canadian governments").
162.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-23.
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States and in the province of Alberta. 163 According to the Board, the
"Keystone XL Pipeline commences at the Hardisty, AB hub, which
receives various types of oil from numerous upstream sources [in
Alberta]. The Applicant is not applying to produce or supply the
product it proposes to ship."164 As such, the "upstream and
downstream facilities [in Alberta and the United States] ...are not
part of the applied-for project, [and] are ... not properly part of the
165
scope of the project or the scope of the environmental assessment.
The Board applied a similarly deferential rationale to its narrow
scope, reminding that "upstream facilities [in Alberta] are or will be
regulated by other governments and operated by numerous corporate
entities. Similar circumstances apply downstream where the project
'166
could deliver crudes to several refineries, in Texas and Louisiana.
In sum, either side of the border was able to explicitly avoid assessing
environmental effects outside of their jurisdiction by assuming that
another government would undergo an adequate analysis.
The Department of State recognized that Alberta's provincial
government would complete an environmental assessment of the oil
sands extraction as well, deferring to their judgment just as the
Board did. 167 However, the transboundary jurisdictional problem
persists despite deference to other governments. Alberta's
environmental assessment is ineffective if it is not taken into
consideration by the parties who maintain jurisdiction over land that
would be affected by the extraction activities in Alberta. For example,
where the pipeline crosses into Saskatchewan, the Board is the only
party with the correct scope to assess the impacts of Keystone XL on
that land, but upstream activities in Alberta could have
extraordinary influence. Similarly, once the pipeline crosses into the
United States, the Department of State is the only party with the
correct jurisdiction to assess the project's impact on those lands;
without correctly accounting for the prior two jurisdictions and their
impacts, the Department of State's assessment is incomplete and fails
to fully provide the information sought by NEPA and environmental
assessment statutes generally.

163.

See

CAN.

NAT'L

ENERGY BD.,

OH-1-2009,

REASONS

FOR

DECISION:

TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE PIPELINE GP LTD. 74 (2010) ("[Tlhe Board is not convinced
that there are sufficient grounds for it to include a consideration of the upstream or
downstream facilities.").
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
KEYSTONE XL FINAL EIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 70, at ES-23
("Government regulators of oil sands activities in Canada are working to manage and
provide regional standards for air quality, land impact, and water quality and
consumption based on a cumulative effects approach.").
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151/

C. DifferentiatingStructuralFailuresfrom Bad-FaithAgency Actors
As noted above, the EPA challenged the Department of State
early on, demanding that it fully and adequately assess the three
transboundary problems discussed by this Part. 168 Throughout the
EIS process, the EPA urged the Department of State to reassess its
conclusions on global oil-demand structures, 16 9 the comparative GHG
intensity of Canadian crude, 170 and the effect of Canadian extraction
and land-use regulation on both Canadian and U.S. environmental
resources. 171 Yet the Department of State's final EIS continued to
maintain an inelastic demand scenario that discounted any change in
global GHG emissions caused by Keystone XL, 172 made assumptions
that shrunk the comparative difference between GHG emissions of
Canadian and other foreign crude oils, 173 and had a narrow domestic
focus that refused to take a hard look at transboundary
74
environmental harms. 1
One explanation for the agency's failure could be that special
interests captured the agency, or that the agency was acting in bad
faith to neglect the goals of EIA for its own purposes. Regardless of
whether this explanation has any merit, this Note cannot solve the
problem of bad faith agency actors and need not solve the problem to
still be constructive. 175 Regardless of the agency's intent, the analysis
above emphasizes that the domestic focus of U.S. EIA law is what
allowed the Department of State to make the crucial assumptions
that discounted transboundary harms. Even assuming the
Department of State acted in bad faith to skew the environmental
assessment, changing the domestic structural bias and expanding the
scope of U.S. EIA law would necessarily force a bad faith agency into
accounting for transboundary harms and creating a more complete
environmental impact assessment.
To achieve such structural reform, a solution must simply create
communication and cooperative assessment across borders, ensuring
that neither party can make assumptions regarding transboundary
harms. To illustrate this point, each of the transboundary harms
described above shared a common reliance on assumptions regarding
Canadian policy choices. As such, this Note proposes a model for
bilateral or multilateral environmental-assessment agreements that

168.
See supra Part III.A.2.
169.
EPA Comments on Draft EIS, supra note 75, at 3-4.
170.
EPA Comments on Supplemental Draft EIS, supra note 89, at 6.
171.
Id. at 7.
172.
See supra Part III.B.1.
173.
See supra Part III.B.2.
174.
See supraPart II.B.3.
175.
But see infra Part IV.E (explaining how cooperative EIA will likely lead to
more transparent review).
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seeks to solve the domestic structural bias of EIA law by inducing
cooperation and cross-border communication to control such
assumptions, all while fulfilling the obligations of existing domestic
EIA law.

IV.

ELEMENTS OF COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL

EIA

To address domestic EIA law's inability to account for
transboundary environmental harms, this Note proposes that states
engage in a cooperative, international EIA. Building off of existing
international agreements, this Part lays out essential elements of an
effective bilateral or multilateral EIA process.
This Note relies heavily on two existing, relevant international
agreements: the Espoo Convention 176 and the Canada-Alberta
Agreement on Cooperative Environmental Assessment (Canada77
Alberta Agreement).'
First, the Espoo Convention provides general guidelines for
engaging in effective transboundary EIA. 178 Originally adopted and
signed by a number of nations in 1991, the Espoo Convention finally
entered into force on September 10, 1997.179 Notable signatories to
the treaty include the United States, Canada, the European Union,
the United Kingdom, and Russia; equally notable is the absence of
Mexico, China, and a number of Middle Eastern oil-producing
countries.18 0 Of the forty-eight nations who have accepted the Espoo
Convention, only Iceland, the United States, and Russia have not
1 81
ratified it and are not directly bound by its contents.
The Canada-Alberta Agreement is an intergovernmental
agreement between the Canadian federal government and the
provincial government of Alberta.' 8 2 Most recently renewed in 2005,
its purpose is to make the EIA process more effective and efficient by
collapsing both parties' EIA obligations into one process when their

Espoo Convention, supra note 6.
176.
177.
Canada-Alberta Agreement on Cooperative Environmental Assessment,
Can.-Alta., July 22, 2005 [hereinafter Can.-Alta. Agreement], available at
http://www.ceaa.gc.caldefault.asp?lang=En&n=F93B8BF6-1. Interestingly, the authors
assumes there is a Canada-Alberta joint EIA for Keystone, but has yet to find it.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.
178.
179.
See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context,

UNITED

NATIONS

TREATY

COLLECTION,

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/

(last
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXVII-4&chapter=27&lang=en
visited Oct. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Espoo Convention Status].
See Espoo Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. n.1.
180.
181.
See Espoo Convention Status, supra note 179 (providing both signing and
ratification dates for each signatory).
Can.-Alta. Agreement, supra note 177, pmbl. ("Canada and Alberta are
182.
committed to undertake cooperative environmental assessments under this bilateral
Agreement....").
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1,5J9

responsibilities overlap.' 8 3 The Canada-Alberta Agreement has been
lauded as importing cooperative environmental assessment from
international law into a binding, domestic obligation, albeit limited to
l8 4
the jurisdiction of Canada.
Together, both the Espoo Convention and the Canada-Alberta
Agreement provide structural tools and content guidelines that can
be used to build an effective bilateral or multilateral cooperative EIA
process. The purpose of this Part is to collect some of these tools and
guidelines into a nonexhaustive list, suggesting essential elements of
a basic model that can be expounded upon and individualized. The
first subpart of this Part refines the scope and applicability of the
guidelines offered by this Note. Parts IV.B, IV.C, and IV.D address
crucial structural elements for an international cooperative EIA
agreement. Finally, Part M.E explains the benefits of adopting an
international cooperative EIA scheme.
A. Scope of the Agreement
The model suggested by this Part is meant to be a flexible model
that could be applied (1) broadly as a multilateral agreement between
many implicated countries, (2) narrowly as a detailed, bilateral
agreement between two countries, or even (3) as a specific condition
to a single international project. Flexibility is necessary since
different situations will merit different structured agreements. For
example, permitting a smog-inducing industrial park in a part of
Europe where many jurisdictions are clustered closely together would
necessitate a multilateral agreement since the smog would likely
cross many jurisdictional boundaries. Conversely, permitting a
logging project in Ukraine that affects wildlife in Poland may only
require a project-specific, bilateral agreement to effectively account
for all transboundary harms caused by the decision.
In light of this necessary flexibility, two principles are important
to keep in mind when determining the scope of a cooperative EIA
agreement. First, the agreement must be binding. One of the most
crucial roles of this model is that it forces the parties to engage in
cooperative EIA rather than just providing an option that a state can

183.
Id. (striving for "greater efficiency and the most effective use of public and
private resources, where assessment processes involving both parties are required by
law, through a single environmental assessment and review process for each proposed
project"). Other versions of the agreement seem to have existed since as early as 1993.
See Steven A. Kennett, Hard Law, Soft Law, and Diplomacy: The Emerging Paradigm
for Intergovernmental Cooperation in Environmental Assessment, 31 ALTA. L. REV. 644,
653 n.55 (1993).
184.
See generally Kennett, supra note 183, at 653 (using the Canada-Alberta
Agreement, and Canadian EIA law generally, as an example of where "soft"
international norms are "hardened" into binding domestic law).
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ignore. 185 As this Note explains below, this is a crucial element of the
Canada-Alberta Agreement, a recognized element of the Espoo
Convention, and an essential element to solving the structural bias in
current domestic EIA law.18 6 Second, the agreement must be feasible.
Forcing two bureaucracies to work together will likely increase
administrative costs. 18 7 The more parties that are added to the
agreement, and the further these parties are geographically apart,
the greater this cost will likely be. As such, effective cooperative
agreements must be tempered by feasibility concerns. As this Note
explains below, parts of the Canada-Alberta Agreement explicitly
seek to streamline administrative burdens;18 8 but where the
agreement cannot be designed to overcome transaction costs between
numerous parties, the agreement will lose effect.
Such a result must be avoided, but not to the point of crippling
the concept. Even piecemeal bilateral adoption of the cooperative EIA
model could dramatically increase awareness of transboundary
environmental harms and result in other significant benefits outlined
below.1 8 9 As a result, this Note strongly urges adoption of cooperative
EIA agreements at whatever level is most feasible, and seeks to
preserve as much flexibility as possible by suggesting elements of an
effective agreement rather than a rigid form agreement.
B. Structure of the Agreement
Regardless of the number of parties, an effective cooperative
agreement should contain three structural elements: a commitment
to assess beyond their jurisdictional borders, a low and mutual
threshold for triggering cooperative review, and a means for
determining a lead party for the cooperative EIA process. Of primary
importance is a commitment by all parties to look beyond their own
jurisdictional lines when assessing environmental harms, similar to
the commitment found in § 11.1 of the Canada-Alberta Agreement. 190
This is the foundational first step of the cooperative EIA agreement.
Next, there should be a low, mutual threshold for triggering
cooperative review. Both the Espoo Convention and the Canada-

185.
See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the Department of State's refusal to fully
assess Keystone XL's transboundary harms pointed out by the EPA); see also supra
Part III.B.3 (noting the Department of State's voluntary inclusion of Canada's
environmental assessment of land-use harms and its problems).
186.
See supra Parts IV.B, IV.E.
187.
See, e.g., supra Part III.A.2 (offering an example of the potential
disagreement and process involved in agency cooperation).
188.
See infra Part III.D.
189.
See infra Part III.E.
190.
Can.-Alta. Agreement, supra note 177, § 11.1 ("The Parties agree that the
environmental effects of a project must be assessed regardless of the location of
jurisdictional boundaries.").
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Alberta Agreement contemplate such a low threshold. In the CanadaAlberta Agreement, cooperative EIA begins once a proponent triggers
a federal action that could "potentially" require cooperative
environmental review. 191 This "potentially" trigger is extremely low,
and both parties to the agreement bear significant responsibility to
notify each other, share all documents, and begin the cooperative
assessment process once the threshold is tripped. 19 2 Similarly, the
Canada-Alberta Agreement creates a mutual responsibility that
triggers cooperative assessment where either party has an
193
environmental-assessment responsibility under their domestic law.
The Espoo Convention also endorses a similar mutual responsibility
by placing the burden to reduce and control transboundary
1 94
environmental harms on each party "either individually or jointly."'
A low, mutual threshold for triggering cooperative ETA ensures
that a single party to the agreement cannot undermine the
cooperative ETA process by either downplaying the environmental
effect of its decision or by structuring its domestic laws to avoid
triggering environmental review. With a low, mutual threshold, either
party's obligation to begin cooperative review is triggered when an
action could potentially cause transboundary harms within either
party's jurisdiction. This creates a very dependent web of
responsibilities that neither party can avoid. While admittedly overinclusive, this trigger is a threshold to reaching the EIA process in
the first place and, thus, an over-inclusive structure is helpful to
structurally ensure that states account for all transboundary harms.
After all, an assessment can still determine that the risk of a
transboundary harm is low, and states can fulfill their obligation at
little cost; the trick is ensuring that the assessment begins in the first
place.
The Canada-Alberta Agreement also provides the third useful
structural tool: the designation of a lead party that will organize the
cooperative EIS process. 195 In the Canada-Alberta Agreement, the
lead party is designated based on which party is "best situated," using
factors such as the size and scope of the assessment with regard to
the relevant jurisdictions, scientific expertise of the parties, physical
proximity of the administering government offices, and other
efficiency considerations. 196 A lead party in a cooperative EIA, like a

Id. § 3.2 ("Once a proponent has filed provincial public disclosure
191.
documents or a federal project description document for a project potentially subject to
a cooperative environmental assessment, the Parties will ...commence the cooperative
environmental assessment.").
Id. § 3.1-.2.
192.
Id. § 6.1.
193.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.1.
194.
Can.-Alta. Agreement, supra note 177, § 5.1.
195.
Id. § 5.6.3.
196.
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lead agency in NEPA, would be particularly useful to help keep
administrative costs down and make cooperative assessments more
feasible by allocating work to the most sophisticated party.
However, the lead party determination should be guarded
against capture to ensure that a party strongly interested in skewing
outcome of the assessment cannot take control. Each agreement could
ensure protection either substantively, by ensuring that all parties
author and contribute to the assessment collectively, or procedurally,
by limiting the power of the lead party to control the focus and
outcome of the assessment.
In addition to the three specific structural tools discussed above,
both the Espoo Convention and the Canada-Alberta Agreement offer
useful guidelines that a cooperative assessment should consider. For
example, the Espoo Convention lists general guidelines for effective
bilateral or multilateral EIA cooperation, such as communicating
party responsibilities up front, harmonizing methodologies, sharing
responsibilities on a reciprocal basis, and defining essential
environmental data, including threshold transboundary harms and
critical loads of transboundary pollution. 197 These elements and
guidelines provide an excellent foundation for a cooperative EIA
agreement that can be augmented by procedural sections from the
Canada-Alberta Agreement. Specific additions from the CanadaAlberta Agreement's sections on Analysis of Environmental
Assessment Information,' s" the Determination of the Need for a
Public Hearing, 199 the Coordination of Decisions, 20 0 and Issue
Management Between Parties 20 1 address the logistical issues of
having multiple parties conferring on a single document, and could be
very helpful in crafting an effective agreement regardless of that
agreement's size.
C. Goals of the Agreement
A cooperative EIA should have at least two explicit goals. First,
the cooperative EIA should seek to fulfill the goals of environmental
assessment, both as understood domestically and internationally.
Earlier Parts of this Note discuss the domestic understanding of EIA,
emphasizing its limited, informational purpose and the essential need

197.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6, app. VI, 2.
198.
Can.-Alta. Agreement, supra note 177, § 6.14-17 (providing a means of
identifying and assigning responsibility inadequacies in a cooperatively created
assessment).
199.
Id. § 7.0-.3.
Id. § 8.0-.2.
200.
201.
Id. § 14.0-.6 (describing, among other things, an escalating structure of
dispute resolution between the parties of the agreement).
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for accuracy and completeness.2 0 2 Similarly, the Espoo Convention
offers an informational goal for EIA in the international context,
namely "to improve the quality of information presented to decision
makers so that environmentally sound decisions can be made paying
careful attention to minimizing significant adverse impact,
particularly in a transboundary context. '20 3 As such, the first goal of
cooperative EIA agreements must be to ensure complete and accurate
information of environmental harms in order to best inform the
decision maker.
Second, cooperative EIA agreements should ensure that the
resulting document fulfills the parties' domestic EIA obligations. This
goal is grounded in the Canada-Alberta Agreement, which explicitly
provides that the result of its cooperative EIA process should fulfill
the domestic EIA obligations of each party. 20 4 Ensuring this goal will
have two impacts. First, fulfilling domestic obligations will make the
model more feasible and prevent needless duplication. Second,
incorporating the cooperative document into domestic law will allow
judicial review under a state's existing EIA jurisprudence. As
exemplified by NEPA jurisprudence, judicial review of the EIA
process preserves public trust and administrative accountability in
EIA law. 20 5 Even with judicial review limited to procedural
protections rather than substantive critiques, 20 6 the process of the
cooperative review is its greatest asset and is thus worth protecting.
By folding in domestic litigation as an accountability tool, cooperative
EIA agreements operate within the best of both worlds: the
agreements maintain the necessary flexibility and transboundary
scope of an international agreement, yet are held accountable to the
procedural standards and enforceability of domestic law.

202.
See supra Part II.B.
203.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6,pmbl.
204.
Can.-Alta. Agreement, supra note 177, § 6.14 ("Each Party agrees to review
the information generated by the cooperative environmental assessment to ensure its
[sic] meets the requirements of the terms of reference for the environmental
assessment report and th[e] Party's respective environmental assessment
requirements.").
205.
For example, the Second Circuit has stated:
Enforcement
compelled

to

of NEPA

prepare

requires

that

the responsible

a[n] . .. EIS... based

on

agencies

adequately

be

compiled

information, analyzed in a reasonable fashion. Only if such a document is
forthcoming can the public be appropriately informed and have any confidence
that the decisionmakers have in fact considered the relevant factors and not
merely swept difficult problems under the rug.
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1034 (2d Cir. 1983).
206.
See supraPart JI.B.
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D. Content of the CooperativeAssessment
The Espoo Convention lists essential elements of an EIS
document that could serve as the skeleton of what is required by any
cooperative assessment report. 20 7 These include elements originally
found in NEPA, such as listing and assessing alternatives to the
action, including a no-action alternative, 208 and including a
description of the environmental impact of the activity and its
alternatives. 2 9 But the Convention also includes particularly useful
modern elements, such as an explanation of any assumptions in
underlying environmental data 210 and direct identification of gaps in
211
knowledge or uncertainty.
The Convention further includes a list of activities that are
presumed to create transboundary environmental harms and, thus,
should immediately trigger the cooperative EIA process. 2 12 This per
se list was later expanded by amendment. 213 Perhaps tellingly, this
list includes large diameter oil pipelines. 2 14 Including a list of
activities that automatically trigger cooperative review would be
useful for two reasons. First, it should make the process more
predictable and more efficient, allowing a party to quickly build and
leverage institutional knowledge when assessing familiar actions.
Second, it allows for a kind of preassessment bargaining between
the States Party to ensure a more credible and more efficient
agreement. For example, if Uruguay and Argentina wished to enter
into a cooperative EIA agreement but were spurned by their shaky
history of transboundary environmental harms, they could negotiate
upfront that all pulp mills on the shared river immediately trigger
cooperative environmental review regardless of other factors. In
exchange, Argentina could agree -that any major fishing activities
that occur on its side of the river would also trigger guaranteed
cooperative review. This bargaining would ensure greater buy-in from
Uruguay and Argentina while creating a more efficient agreement

207.
See Espoo Convention, supra note 6, app. II (describing the content of the
environmental-impact-assessment documentation).
208.
See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(iii) (2006) (requiring agencies to
"include... a detailed statement.., on... alternatives to the proposed action")
209.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6, app. II; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(i)
(requiring agencies to "include ... a detailed statement ... on ... the environmental

impact of the proposed action").
210.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6, app. II.
211.
Id.
212.
Id. app. I.
213.
See Meeting of the Parties of the Espoo Convention, Decision 111/7, Second
Amendment to the Espoo Convention, app., Jun. 4, 2012, available at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/27 4cEnglish.pdf.
214.
Id.
8.
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that guarantees full assessment of actions
transboundary problems in the past.

that have caused

E. Benefits of Adopting CooperativeEJA Agreements
At minimum, widespread adoption of cooperative EIA
agreements could lead to five benefits. First, cooperative
environmental assessment will necessarily lead to a more
transparent assessment. Most transboundary environmental harms
are asymmetrical, meaning that one country bears a greater
environmental cost than another.2 15 For example, a country with a
smoggy manufacturing plant may be harmed by air pollution just as
their neighbor is, but its neighbor does not gain the benefit of the
products produced by the plant. Further, most countries exchange
216
For
fundamentally different transboundary environmental harms.
example, a primary environmental concern of Canada in developing
the oil sands might be the extensive strip mining of Alberta, while the
United States may be primarily concerned with increased GHG
emissions that will result from opening the market to Canadian crude
oil.
Asymmetrical and fundamentally different harms place two
cooperating countries in different bargaining positions. Presuming
that neither self-interested country wants to fully internalize a
significant environmental harm caused by their neighbor for free,
these different bargaining positions create an incentive for a country
to fully disclose their environmental harms to the other. The more
detail a country can disclose about the nature of its environmental
harms, the more likely it can guarantee that it is not internalizing
the costs of their neighbor. Further, the more transboundary
environmental harms a country can hold its neighbor accountable for
in a public cooperative process, the better a country looks to its public
constituency. Thus, a cooperative EIA process creates strong
incentives for the parties to be more transparent than in domestic
EIA.
Second, cooperative EIA agreements will better fulfill the
purpose of environmental assessment and will comply with
international norms. The fundamental purpose of EIA law is to

See Edward A. Parson & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Equal Measures and Fair
215.
Burdens: Negotiating Environmental Treaties in an Unequal World 5 (Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, Discussion Paper No. E-93-03, 1993),
http:/belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication2893/equal-measuresandfair_
burdens.html ("But in most cases, the nations joining a treaty are highly asymmetric in
their interests on the environmental issue being negotiated-how strongly they want to
improve it, and how much it costs them to make any particular level of contribution to
the effort.").
Id. at 10-14.
216.
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produce complete and accurate information on the environmental
costs of a decision, and that purpose is undermined where
transboundary harms are not addressed.2 17 Further, international
norms require a country to engage in adequate EIA where
transboundary harms are implicated. 218 Cooperative EIA agreements
provide a binding, efficient, and effective way to bring transboundary
harms into a country's existing EIA law.
Third, cooperative EIA agreements could bring greater
awareness to transboundary harms, helping fill a hole in
environmental policy. 219 Forcing parties to engage in a bargaining
process at a national level could draw the attention of
nongovernmental organizations, interested citizens, and other
stakeholders who are sensitive to the problem of transboundary
harms. Even bilateral cooperative EIA agreements that are limited in
scope could help identify regional transboundary harms and spur
movement towards a broader, multilateral solution.
Fourth, cooperative EIA agreements could force greater
compliance with EIA law generally. For example, if an agreement is
set up with a low, mutual threshold for triggering cooperative review,
countries with robust EIA laws and strong compliance could trigger
cooperative review with less compliant neighbors. In countries like
China that have dismal compliance rates with domestic EIA
procedures, 220 a strong web of interconnected, cooperative review
would increase participation in EIA while spreading the cost amongst
multiple parties.
Fifth, cooperative EIA and better assessment of transboundary
harms will likely result in better environmental quality. Although
EIA generally does not substantively control decisions, the process
itself often provides synergistic benefits to decision makers that

217.
See supra Part II.B.
218.
See id.; see also supra Part II.C (discussing Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay).
219.
See, e.g., Espoo Convention, supra note 6, pmbl. (coming to agreement,
"[m]indful of the need and importance to develop anticipatory policies and of
preventing, mitigating and monitoring significant adverse environmental impact.., in
a transboundary context").
220.

A joint investigation by [China's environmental agency] and Ministry
of Land and Resources in 2004 shows that 30 to 40 percent of the
mining construction projects went through the procedure of
environment impact assessment as required, while in some areas only
6 to 7 percent did so. This partly explains why China has witnessed so
many mining accidents in recent years.

Lin Gu, China Improves Enforcement of Environmental Laws, EMBASSY OF CHINA IN
THE

U.K.

OF

GR.

BRIT.

&

N.

IR.

embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t2 14565.htm.

(Sept.

29,

2009),

http://www.chinese-

2012]

THE GRASS IS ALWAYS GREENER

1527

increase awareness and consideration of environmental issues. 221 The
EIA process educates decision makers such that they better
understand future environmental concerns and will begin to
recognize environmental issues in other arenas. 22 2 Similarly, the EIA
process educates the participating parties, and will add more
sophisticated and constructive environmental criticism to the process
as the parties gain experience. 22 3 Collectively, these synergistic
influences will result in a more complete and efficient EIA process,
which, if consistent with the purpose of EIA generally, will lead to
more environmentally conscious decision making and better
environmental quality.

V. CONCLUSION

The goal here is not to reinvent the wheel. Much of the necessary
infrastructure and knowledge to adequately assess transboundary
environmental harms exists within domestic EIA law and practice,
and transboundary harms are, by necessity, happening within the
borders of some jurisdiction. The problem is that this law is stuck
between the state lines.
An exploration of the Keystone XL pipeline assessment drives
this point home by connecting the abstract transboundary problem
with a tangible global energy decision. The U.S. decision to permit the
pipeline could have had an immense impact on global oil markets,
both national and global GHG emissions, and land use in Alberta,
among other harms. And yet the U.S. environmental assessment of

221.

For instance, an international survey of EIA practitioners in the mid1990s suggested that, quite apart from its immediate influence on
proposals, EIA confers other benefits, such as increasing
environmental awareness and learning amongst participants. More
recent studies also highlight the potential for critical education to take
place amongst participants involved in EIA processes. This is likely to
contribute to greater consideration of environmental concerns in the
future, both by proponents, whose plans may become more
environmentally acceptable from the outset, and by decision-makers,
who may come to demand higher standards of environmental
protection.
If EIA does facilitate environmental learning amongst communities
and other stakeholders involved in EIA processes, this greater
environmental awareness is likely to be brought to bear not only on
future development proposals but also in societal debate about the
broader direction of development.

Jay, supra note 4, at 294 (citations omitted).
222,
Id.
223.
Id.
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the project resisted fully addressing these environmental costs
because it would not and could not reach across the Canadian border.
The goal then is to bridge the gap, cross the lines, and connect
nations. This Note provides a flexible set of guidelines for making
with bilateral or multilateral cooperative
that connection
environmental assessment agreements. These guidelines can provide
a step towards solving the transboundary problem in EIA or, at
minimum, provide a springboard for livening discussion on this global
problem.
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